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What	will	post-Brexit	industrial	strategy	look	like?
Until	we	know	exactly	what	kind	of	Brexit	we	are	going	to	get,	writes	Steve	Coulter	(LSE),	it	is
difficult	for	Britain	to	craft	an	informed	industrial	strategy.	Yet	that	is	what	the	government	is	trying
to	do.	If	the	UK	does	leave	the	Single	Market	and	customs	union,	it	may	come	under	pressure	to
intervene	heavily	in	some	manufacturing	industries.	It	might	also	be	wise	to	invest	in	sectors	like
life	sciences,	which	could	prosper	in	the	global	market	the	government	aspires	to	enlarge.
In	November	2017	the	government	published	its	long-awaited	White	Paper	on	‘industrial	strategy’.
With	Brexit	lurking	in	the	background,	the	paper	attracted	a	degree	of	interest	that	doesn’t	usually	swirl	around	such
policy	submissions.	In	fact,	Brexit	was	probably	one	of	the	least	interesting	things	in	the	White	Paper	–	largely
because	we	don’t	know	what	kind	of	Brexit	is	coming,	so	there	wasn’t	much	it	could	usefully	say	on	the	matter.
Instead,	it	carefully	laid	out	the	government’s	thinking	on	its	responses	to	a	fast-changing	global	economy	whose
challenges,	and	also	opportunities,	will	surely	be	amplified	by	the	disruption	from	quitting	the	EU.
‘Discovery’,	a	Northampton	statue	by	Lucy	Glendinning	commemorating	the	life	of	one	of	the
scientists	who	discovered	DNA.	Photo:	dawrwickphotography	via	a	CC-BY	2.0	licence
Does	industry	need	a	‘strategy’?
Before	getting	to	Brexit,	though,	it’s	worth	examining	how	we	got	to	the	point	where	a	Conservative	government	is
cheerfully	laying	out	detailed	plans	to	intervene	in	the	free	market.	For	an	‘industrial	strategy’	is	really	just	a	nice,
holistic-sounding	word	for	an	old	idea	–	industrial	policy.	Industrial	policy	is	any	type	of	government	intervention	that
tries	to	improve	the	business	environment	or	alter	the	structure	of	economic	activity,	for	example	by	encouraging
firms	to	move	into	higher	value-added	market	sectors.	Mainstream	economics	has	long	acknowledged	a	role	for
governments	in	attending	to	failures	of	the	market	that	may	see	firms	under-invest	in	public	goods	like	training	or
R&D.	There	is	also	a	growing	appreciation	of	the	role	of	the	state	in	catalysing	private	sector	restructuring	and
sharing	risks.
Economists	commonly	identify	two	main	types	of	industrial	policy:	‘horizontal’	policy,	consisting	of	broad,	sector
neutral	inputs	into	things	like	training	and	infrastructure;	and	‘vertical’,	which	single	out	specific	sectors	like
aerospace	for	special	treatment.	In	practice,	the	two	types	tend	to	merge	somewhat	–	a	training	policy	that	priorities
robotics	skills,	for	example.
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Almost	all	governments	do	industrial	policy,	whether	they	admit	to	it	or	not.	But	the	UK	has	a	particularly	chequered
record	which	means	any	mention	of	the	term	invites	derision	about	the	folly	of	‘picking	winners’.	This	summons	bad
memories	of	industrial	policy,	1970s-style,	when	vast	subsidies	went	to	prop	up	loss-making	industries	like	cars	and
shipbuilding	in	an	abortive	bid	to	save	jobs	and	preserve	national	champions.	Vertical,	or	sector-specific,	industrial
policy	is	particularly	prone	to	being	captured	by	the	recipients	of	governments’	well-meaning	largesse,	as	picking
winners	morphs	easily	into	backing	losers.	But	even	uncontroversial-sounding	horizontal	policies	are	prone	to	costly
mistakes,	given	the	inherent	difficulty	of	guessing	industries’	needs	and	devising	policies	to	meet	them.
Historically,	therefore,	industrial	policy	has	evolved	to	try	to	reconcile	these	two	types	of	failure	–	market	and
government.	The	White	Paper	does	this	by	incorporating	lessons	from	the	past,	such	as	getting	sectors	to	compete
for	funding	rather	than	simply	doling	it	out.	In	setting	out	various	‘missions’,	such	as	preparing	for	an	ageing
workforce,	it	focuses	on	outcomes	rather	than	processes,	and	the	Paper	also	has	a	good	sense	of	Place	through	the
emphasis	on	regional	clusters.	The	Strategy	acknowledges	the	changing	nature	of	the	global	economy,	particularly
the	emergence	of	international	production	chains,	not	to	mention	opportunities	to	exploit	artificial	intelligence.
Brexit	means	what	industrial	strategy?
Above	all	this	hovers	the	most	fundamental	economic	challenge	of	all	–	Brexit.	The	White	Paper	mentions	Brexit
frequently,	but	obliquely,	as	though	cautious	about	assigning	to	it	specific	policy	commitments.	The	main	reason	for
this	is	that	we	still	don’t	know	what	Brexit	we	are	going	to	get.	A	‘soft’	Brexit,	as	favoured	by	the	Treasury	and	most	of
British	industry,	would	see	the	UK	remaining	closely	integrated	with	the	European	economy,	probably	remaining	in
the	customs	union,	if	not	the	Single	Market.	Such	an	outcome	implies	no	urgent	new	role	for	industrial	policy	over
and	above	that	required	to	deal	with	the	ongoing	challenges	mentioned	above.
A	hard	Brexit	is	another	matter	entirely.	Being	outside	the	customs	union	implies	major	disruption	to	manufacturing
supply	chains.	Components	for	cars,	for	example,	whizz	back	and	forth	across	the	Channel	before	ending	up	in	the
finished	vehicle.	Even	small	extra	costs	and	delays	at	the	point	of	entry	would	disrupt	business	models	which	rely	on
keeping	minimal	inventories	to	bear	down	on	costs.	Outside	the	customs	union,	there	is	a	clear	risk	they	may	invest
elsewhere	to	avoid	this.	An	industrial	policy	for	a	hard	Brexit	could	usefully	be	tasked	with	nurturing	UK	component
suppliers	to	reduce	the	industry’s	heavy	reliance	on	imports.
Similarly,	shifting	UK	trade	from	Europe	to	America	and	the	Far	East,	if	successfully	achieved,	entails	forging	new
economic	relationships	with	countries	with	different	consumer	markets	and	patterns	of	comparative	advantage.
There	may	be	an	enhanced	role	for	the	government	or	–	ideally	–	quasi-public	bodies	such	as	the	new	Business
Bank	or	the	Local	Enterprise	Partnerships	set	up	by	the	coalition	government,	in	helping	to	coordinate	the	necessary
restructuring.
A	government	really	prepared	to	bite	the	bullet	could	go	even	further	down	the	interventionist	route.	For	example,
exiting	the	EU	and	its	stringent	rules	on	state	aid	affords	a	much	freer	hand	to	directly	support	‘strategic’	industries.
The	government	has	already	started	down	this	road	with	its	open-ended	commitment	to	Nissan	to	protect	the
Japanese	car	firm’s	future	investments	from	Brexit-related	uncertainty.	Such	deals	might	sound	tempting,	especially
if	a	hard	Brexit	starts	to	go	wrong,	but	it	carries	clear	dangers	of	government-capture	and	other	investors	would
surely	demand	similar	guarantees.
A	more	canny	strategy	would	be	to	target	support	at	established	industries	competing	in	growing	markets	that	might
stand	to	benefit	from	the	more	global	approach	that	Brexit	possibly	affords.	The	£64bn	life	sciences	sector	is	a	good
example	of	a	UK	success	story	in	an	industry	replete	with	market	failures	owing	to	its	riskiness	and	the	heavy	up-
front	investment	required	in	skilled	technicians	and	R&D.	Life	sciences	is	one	of	four	sector	deals	singled	out	for
special	attention	in	the	form	of	heavy	investment	and	institution-building	–	presented,	of	course,	as	a	‘partnership’
with	industry.
Will	it	be	enough?	UK	governments	have	not	covered	themselves	in	glory	with	their	use	of	industrial	policy.	The
country’s	excessive	centralisation	and	paucity	of	effective	coordinating	institutions	may	derail	the	best	of	intentions.
All	the	talk	of	high	technology	and	industries	of	the	future	may	not	produce	many	jobs	for	humans	if	automation	takes
off	as	envisaged,	fuelling	the	discontent	that	led	to	the	Leave	vote.	Brexit,	even	if	it	succeeds,	will	probably	be	too
disruptive	a	process	for	governments	to	tame	with	policy.	The	White	Paper	is	a	good	start	though.
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This	post	represents	the	views	of	the	author	and	not	those	of	the	Brexit	blog,	nor	the	LSE.
Dr	Steve	Coulter	is	a	Visiting	Fellow	in	the	European	Institute	of	the	London	School	of	Economics.
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